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NoTEs
Romer, Hurley, and Dale:
How the Supreme Court Languishes
with "Special Rights"
BY CHRISTOPHER S. HARGIS*
INTRODUCTION
he past twenty-five years span the birth and dramatic increase in
legal protections extended to gay' and lesbian individuals on
both state and local levels. In the past ten years, the Common-
wealth of Kentucky alone has witnessed the defeat of the state's sodomy
statute,2 the passage of four municipal ordinances prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination, the extension ofhate crime protectionto crimes
* J.D. expected 2001, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank
those individuals without whose support this Note would not have been completed,
specifically Matt Morrisson, Jeff Jones, and my parents, Steve and Debbie Hargis.
'Terminology can be confusing, much debated, and misleading in the dialogue
concerning sexual orientation. The authorhas usedtheterms "homosexual,""gay,"
and "lesbian" interchangeably in the text. Each term has its own scope of coverage
and connotation, and, for that reason, the author has included them all. No
preference or alternative message is suggested by any use of any term other than
simply signifying anon-heterosexual sexual orientation. For clarity, the author has
omitted using the term "bisexual," though that omission indicates nothing more
than a search for clarity for the reader. Indeed, in the debate over the moral,
societal, personal, and political ramifications surrounding sexual orientation,
bisexuality is as fervently debated as any other orientation.
2 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). Kentucky was
the first state to overturn its sodomy statute after the Supreme Court's decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3 Jefferson County, Ky., Ordinance No. 36-1999 (Oct. 12, 1999); Henderson,
Ky., OrdinanceNo. 33-99 (Sept. 28,1999); Lexington, Ky., Ordinance No. 201-99
(July 8, 1999); Louisville, Ky., Ordinance No. 9-1999 (Feb. 1, 1999).
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motivated by sexual orientation animus,, and a proposal to extend the
state's civil rights protections to include sexual orientation.' In 1999, the
cities of Louisville, Lexington, and Henderson, along with Jefferson
County, passed "fairness"' ordinances prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation and, with the exception of Henderson's ordinance,
gender identity.7 The ordinances cover the areas of employment, housing,
and public accommodations! Louisville's ordinance, however, is limited
to employment.
While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' has been the federal
statutory remedy for groups to attack private and public discrimination,10
4 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 532.031 (Michie 1999 & Supp.
2000) (effective July 15, 1998).
s H.R. 7, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000) (sponsored by Representatives K. Stein, H.
Anderson, and M. Marzian). House Bill 7 was referred to the House Judiciary
Committee on January 4, 2000, but no further action was recorded by the
Legislative Research Commission. See House Bill 7 (2000), available at
http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/record/00rs/HB7/ bill.doc (last modified June 2,
2000).
6 The four ordinances recently passed in Kentucky were colloquially referred
to as "fairness" ordinances by many. Ironically, the "fairness" of the ordinances
is at the heart of the debate over the ordinances and this Note. The term was also
used to refer to one of the primary bodies supporting the legislation throughout
the state-the Kentucky Fairness Alliance. Irrespective of the origin of the
phrase, the author has continued to use the term to refer to the laws for clarity
purposes.
Gender identity is a concept included in three of the four ordinances passed
in Kentucky and has increasingly been included in laws prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination. The authorhas refrained from discussinggender identity
beyond noting its inclusion in three of Kentucky's ordinances for clarity and
brevity. Furthermore, almost all of the legal dialogue concerning this area is
couched in terms of "sexual orientation." While many, including those in the legal
profession, group sexual orientation and gender identity together, the distinctness
of the concepts from each other is debated. The confusion and misunderstanding
surrounding the concepts are additional reasons the author has focused the
discussion solely on sexual orientation. Hopefully, this will not add to the
conundrum regarding these concepts.
'Bowling Green, Kentucky has followed suit and become the fifth Kentucky
city to take up the issue of legal protections for homosexuals. See Jason Riley, Gay
Rights Issue Arrives, DAILYNEWS (Bowling Green, Ky.), Sept. 21, 1999, at IA.
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
" Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
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homosexuals have consistently been denied recovery under Title VII."
Addressing the issue of sexual orientation discrimination has, thus, been
left largely to state and local governments." Since the passage of the first
municipal ordinance addressing discrimination against homosexuals in
Lansing, Michigan in 1972,"3 eleven states have banned discrimination
based on sexual orientation, 4 and, as of 1999, approximately 203 cities and
counties had followed suit. 5 In addition, seven states have banned sexual
" See Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table
opinion), available at 1992 WL 5436, at *7-8; Williamson v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989); Blum v. GulfOil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th
Cir. 1979); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979);
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Kelley v.
Vaughn, 760 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
2 Federal efforts have consistently failed. The most prominent effort has been
the attempted passage of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act ("ENDA").
ENDA was introduced in 1994. S. 2238, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 4636, 103d
Cong. (1994). Passage was unsuccessfully attempted again in 1995, S. 932, 104th
Cong. (1995); H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995), in 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong.
(1996), in 1997, S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997), and
again in 1999, S. 1276, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999).
Currently, ENDA is included in the Protecting Civil Rights forAll Americans Act,
S. 19, 107th Cong. (2001).
13 Developments in the Law--Employment Discrimination (pt. 4), 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1625, 1625 (1996).
14SeeCONN. GEN. STAT.ANN. § 46a-81a(West 1995); HAw. REV. STAT. § 368-
1 (1993); MASs.ANN. LAWS ch. 15 lB, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1999); MIMN. STAT.ANN.
§ 363.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (2000); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:6 (Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993
& Supp. 2000); RI. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-5 (1995 & Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 3, § 961 (1996 & Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36 (West 1997 & Supp.
2000). In Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 87 (1991), the
California Court of Appeals found that homosexuality is the equivalent of a
political activity or association and, therefore, discrimination is prohibited under
the California Labor Code. Section 1101(b) of the Code prohibits employers from
making, adopting or enforcing any policy that tends to control or direct the political
activities or affiliations of employees. CAL. LAB. CODE § 110 l(b) (West 1989). In
1997, the Maine legislature enacted legislation prohibiting employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552
(West 1989 & Supp. 2000). In February 1998, the law was repealed by a "people's
veto." See Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Repeal a Law on Gay Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at Al.
15 See Legal Defense and Education Fund, Summay of States, Cities, and
Counties WhichProhibitDiscriminationBasedonSexulOrientationathttp'I/www.
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orientation discrimination in public employment via executive order. 6
These changes, however, have met with resistance. From a strong dissent
in Romer v. Evans7 to bitter opposition at the local level over recent
"fairness" efforts in Kentucky, 8 opponents of laws prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination have fought as fervently as the laws' proponents.
The arguments erected against the passage of such efforts have been many
and varied, ranging from the passage of laws prohibiting such ordinances, 9
attacking the laws post-hoc on constitutional grounds,2" and advancing that
such efforts are really "special rights" when such laws are considered.2'
This Note focuses on the current debates surrounding laws addressing
sexual orientation discrimination. Specifically, what are the efforts
mounted against such legislation? Are they effective? Moreover, what
fallacies buttress such efforts?
Part I details recent ordinances passed in Jefferson County, Louisville,
Lexington, and Henderson, Kentucky as prototypical examples of local
efforts to end sexual orientation discrimination.
Part II explores the treatment federal courts have afforded state and
local efforts to prohibit or overturn laws prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination.' Part II also focuses on the Supreme Court's decision in
Romer v. Evans24 as contrasted to the Sixth Circuit's Equality Foundation
of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati25 opinion.
lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=217 (lastvisited Jan. 28,
2001).
' See Legal Defense and Education Fund, Summary ofStates Which Prohibit
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/pages/documents/record?record=185 (last visited Jan. 28, 2001). The states
include Colorado, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Washington.
'7 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 639, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (labeling the majority opinion "ridiculous," "absurd," "terminal silliness,"
and an undermining of democracy).
1s See, e.g., Chris Poynter, Anti-bias Ordinances Fuel Political, Religious
Debate, COURiER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 18, 1999, at Al; Chris Poynter,
Public Sounds Off On Gay Rights: Henderson's City Commission Weighs
Ordinance, COuRIER-JouRNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 15, 1999, at B4.
'9 See infra Part II.
20 See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part IV.
2 See infra notes 32-73 and accompanying text.
S ee infra notes 74-152 and accompanying text.
2 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
5 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d289
(6th Cir. 1997) (Equality Foundation 11).
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Part III examines challenges against laws prohibiting discrimination
based upon conflicting constitutional values.26 The Supreme Court's
decisions in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian andBisexual Group of
Boston, Inc.' and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale28 stand as the first two
examples of the Court balancing the interests behind such
antidiscrimination laws and the interests allegedly infringed.
PartIV addresses the Supreme Court's acknowledgment ofthe "special
rights" argument29 and asks if such ordinances grant "special rights." While
the cases addressing statutory bars to fairness efforts contain arguments
over "special rights," the Supreme Court cases addressing the infringement
of constitutional rights by such laws are riddled with presumptions and
implied assertions about homosexuals-who they are, how they behave,
and what they believe. Those assumptions will be critically examined. Part
IV also briefly explores the treatment of homosexuality as "political
activity" in response to a "special rights" argument."
Despite the myriad of attacks launched against efforts to protect
homosexuals from discrimination, this Note argues that the protection
emanating from the laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination
should be viewed as the Supreme Court viewed them in Romer: "nothing
special."'
I. ORDINANCES PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION
ON THE BASIS OF SExuAL ORIENTATION N KENTUCKY
A. Pre- "Fairness" Kentucky
Historically, laws addressing homosexuals have been criminal, not
civil. Homosexual sodomy was punished at common law,32 and has been a
26See infra notes 153-238 and accompanying text.
27Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
1 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).29 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626; Equality Foundation 1, 128 F.3d at 298.
'0 See, e.g., Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 87-88 (App.
1991) (holding that the expression of homosexual orientation was a protected
political activity),petitionfor review granted, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 180 (1992), appeal
dismissed per stipulation, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1993).3 1 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
32 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 490-91 (Ky. 1993)
(citing Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 118 S.W. 943 (Ky. 1909)).
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criminal offense in Kentucky as far back as 1860."3 The 1860 statute
criminalized anal intercourse between men, but did not address oral
intercourse or conduct by women.' However, the 1974 Penal Code, with
the enactment of K.R.S. section 510.070, included "deviate sexual
intercourse" within the scope of Kentucky's sodomy law.35 This language
included women and punished homosexual oral copulation.3 6 However, in
1992, the Kentucky Supreme Court held the criminalization of homosexual
sodomy to be unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Wasson.37 The Wasson
court held that K.R.S. section 5 10.100 violated equal protection and the
guarantees of individual liberty provided in the Kentucky Constitution by
making "deviate sexual intercourse" with another of the same sex a crime.38
The court stated:
The statute before us is in violation of Kentucky constitutional protection
in Section Three that "all men (persons), when they form a social
compact, are equal," and in Section Two that "absolute and arbitrary
power over the lives, liberty and property offree men (persons) exists
nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority."39
While also finding that the sodomy law impermissibly violated the right
to privacy implicit in the Kentucky Constitution, the court invoked John
Stuart Mill:
The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute .... The principle requires
liberty of taste and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own
character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may
follow; without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we
33 1 KY. REV. STAT., ch. 28, art. IV, § 11 (1860).
34 See Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 118 S.W. 943 (Ky. 1909) (holding that
two men could not be convicted under I KY. REV. STAT., ch. 28, art. IV, § 11
(1860) for oral intercourse because the statute only prohibited anal intercourse).
35K.R.S. § 510.070 (Michie 1999).
36 See id § 510.100(1); see also id § 510.010(1) (defining deviate sexual
intercourse as "any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one
persons and the mouth or anus of another").
31 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
381d at 501.
39Id at 500 (emphasis added).
1194 [VOL. 89
do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct
foolish, perverse, or wrong.4
The notions of privacy and liberty that the court invoked in order to
strike down the state's sodomy statute in 1992 resurfaced throughout the
remainder of the decade. The state grappled with hate crime protection for
homosexuals4' and the prohibition on same-sex marriages,42 eventually
culminating in 1999 with the passage of four municipal ordinances
prohibiting various types of discrimination against lesbians and gays.43
B. The Louisville Ordinance
The "fairness" ordinance passed in Louisville" stands as the first of its
kind in Kentucky4 5 and the most limited ordinance in scope. Adopted in
February 1999, the ordinance addresses employment discrimination based
upon sexual orientation and gender identity 6 Unlike later Kentucky
ordinances, the Louisville effort did not cover sexual orientation discrimi-
nation in the areas of housing or public accommodations.47 The ordinance
was actually an amendment to the city's existing employment discrim-
ination laws.48 The Louisville ordinance prohibited any discrimination
based upon sexual orientation or gender identity, absent a bona fide
occuiiational qualification.49 The ordinance did provide exceptions for
4 Id. at 496 (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 386 (Ky.
1909) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER
ESSAYS (MacMillion Co. 1926) (1859))).
41 See K.R.S. § 532.031 (Michie 1999) (effective July 15, 1998).
4 2 See K.R.S. § 402.045 (Michie 1999) (effective July 15, 1998).
43See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
4Louisville, Ky., Ordinance No. 9-1999 (Feb. 1, 1999).
45The first city in Kentucky to adopt a provision protecting homosexuals was
Henderson, Kentucky in 1996. The city of Henderson placed a non-discrimination
clause in its application for city employment. Job application for city employment
Henderson Ky. (1996) (on file with author).
I Louisville, Ky., Ordinance No. 9-1999 (Feb. 1, 1999).
47 See id. § 98.15(A) (prohibiting discrimination in connection with employ-
ment).
48 See Louisville, Ky., Ordinance No. 9-1999 (Feb. 1, 1999).
49 CITY OF LOuISvILLE, KY. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 98.18(A). The ordinance
defines "sexual orientation" as "[a]n individual's actual or imputed heterosexuality,
homosexuality, or bisexuality" and "gender identity" as "(A) [H]aving a gender
identity as a result of a sex change surgery; or (B) [M]anifesting, for reasons other
than dress, an identity not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness
"'SPECIAL RIGHTS" 11952000-2001]
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religious institutions50 and explicitly allowed the enforcement of dress
codes.51
C. The Lexington Ordinance
Lexington's "fairness" ordinance, 2 the second such effort in the state,
stands as the broadest municipal provision addressing sexual orientation
discrimination in the state. 3 Passed by the Council of the Lexington-
Fayette Urban County Government the ordinance prohibits discrimination
based upon sexual orientation and gender identity in the areas of employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations.' Before passage, the
ordinance was amended to allow the enforcement of gender-specific
bathrooms"s and dress codes appropriate to an employee's sex. 6 Like the
ordinance in Louisville, the Lexington effort provided exceptions for
religious groups, but any group receiving a majority of its funding from
local, state, or federal funds was not exempt 7 The Lexington ordinance
does not grant to an aggrieved individual the right to sue; rather, complaints
are referred to the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights
Commission for reconciliation.58 If reconciliation fails, then the Lexington-
Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission holds a public hearing. 9
D. The Henderson Ordinance
Henderson became the third Kentucky city to pass a "fairness"
ordinance in September 1999.' Unlike the ordinances of Louisville and
or femaleness." Id. § 98.16.50 1d §§ 98.00, 98.18(B), (C).
51 Id § 98.17(G)(1).
2 Lexington, Ky., Ordinance No. 201-99 (July 8, 1999).
51 Compare id with Louisville, Ky., Ordinance No. 9-1999 (Feb. 1, 1999),
Henderson, Ky., OrdinanceNo. 33-99 (Sept. 28,1999), andJefferson County, Ky.,
Ordinance No. 36-1999 (Oct. 12, 1999).
54 LEXINGTON-FAYETrE, KY., CHARTER AND CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-33(1)
(1999). The ordinance defines "sexual orientation" as "an individual's actual or
imputed heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality," and "gender identity" as
"having a gender identity as a result of a sex change surgery; or... manifesting,
for reasons other than dress, an identity not traditionally associated with one's
biological maleness or femaleness." Id. § 2-33(4)-(5).
5s Id § 2-33(6)(b).
-6Id § 2-33(6)(a).
s57 1d § 2-33(7).
5 Id § 2-33(3).
59 Id. § 2-32(2)(e).
60 Henderson, Ky., Ordinance No. 33-99 (Sept. 28, 1999).
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Lexington, which addressed gender identity, the ordinance in Henderson
covered only sexual orientation.6' The scope of Henderson's ordinance was
as broad as the Lexington ordinance, covering employment, housing, and
public accommodations.62 Like the previous ordinances, the Henderson
ordinance provided exemptions for religious organizations, though, like
Lexington, organizations were not entitled to the exemption ifthey received
a majority of their funding from local, state, or federal funds.63 The
ordinance carried a $250 fine for violations." The Henderson City-County
Human Relations Commission had the ability to provide mediation services
to involved parties.65
On March 13, 2001, the Henderson City Commission voted to repeal
the ordinance, eighteen months after the initial passage of the law.'
Between the passage of the ordinance and its repeal, an election occurred,
shifting support for the ordinance to a minority on the Commission.67
E. The Jefferson County Ordinance
Jefferson County, Kentucky became the fourth Kentucky polity to
address sexual orientation discrimination in October 1999.68 The ordinance
prohibited discrimination based upon sexual orientation and gender
identity69 in the areas of employment,70 housing,7' and public accommoda-
6 Compare Id with Louisville, Ky., Ordinance No. 9-1999 (Feb. 1, 1999), and
Lexington, Ky., Ordinance No. 201-99 (July 8, 1999). "Sexual orientation" is
defined by the ordinance as "a person's actual heterosexuality, homosexuality, or
bisexuality of a person; or the supposed heterosexuality, homosexuality, or
bisexuality of a person as perceived by another person." Henderson, Ky.,
Ordinance No. 33-99, § 10-40 (Sept. 28, 1999).
62 Henderson, Ky., Ordinance No. 33-99, § 10-41(a)-(c).
63 Id § 10-42(c).
64 Id § 10-45.
65 1d § 10-44.
66 Chuch Stinnett, Fairness Law Falls: Supporters Vote to Take Their Fight to
the Next Level, THE GLEANER (Henderson, Ky.), Mar. 14,2001, at Al.67 Id
68 Jefferson County, Ky., Ordinance No. 36-1999 (Oct. 12, 1999).
69 JEFFERSON COUNTY, KY., CODE OF ORDiNANCES § 92.02 (1999). The
ordinance defines "sexual orientation" as "[ain individual's actual or imputed
heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality" and "gender identity" as
"[m]anifesting an identity not traditionally associated with one's biological
maleness or femaleness."
70 Id § 92.06.
71 Id § 92.03.
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tions.7 The Louisville and Jefferson County Human Relations Commission
has the responsibility of handling complaints based upon the ordinance. 3
II. LAWS PROHIBITING STATUTORY
PROTECTIONS ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Laws protecting homosexuals from discrimination have drawn a myriad
of responses. Such laws have been attacked by cries of "special rights"
during their enactment74 and have been attacked on constitutional grounds
after their promulgation." The first case, however, to reach the Supreme
Court involving the legal protection of lesbian and gay citizens was Romer
v. Evans.76 The case involved an effort to overturn protective ordinances
passed in Colorado and, more importantly, to prohibit any such further
legislation.' Romer called into question the very ability of gay and lesbian
groups to advocate for laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.
The victory in Romer was heralded as a turning point in the fight for civil
rights for homosexuals.78 The hope that Romer captured has been short-
lived as subsequent efforts have called into question its efficacy.79
A. Romer v. Evans
In response to the passage of several municipal ordinances prohibiting
discrimination based upon sexual orientation," Colorado voters passed
Amendment 2 to the Colorado State Constitution.' The Amendment
precluded any legislative, executive, or judicial action at any state or local
n Id § 92.05.
731d § 92.08.
74 See infra Part IV.
7- See infra Part Im.
6 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
77See id at 623-24.
8 See Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival
of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 67, 67-68.
79 See infra Part lI.B; see also, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.
v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (Equality Foundation II).
10 See ASPEN MUN. CODE § 15.04.570 (1977); BOULDERREv. CODE §§ 12-1-1
to 12-1-11 (1987); DENVER REV. MUN. CODE, art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991).
Discrimination was prohibited in areas such as employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, and health and welfare services. Id.
", COLO. CONST. amend. 2 (repealed 1996).
1198 [VOL. 89
level which sought to protect individuals based upon their "homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships."' 2
A trial court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement
of Amendment 2.1 Upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny because it violated the
fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political
process. 4 Upon remand, the trial court rejected the state's arguments
regarding the compelling interests behind the amendment 5 and enjoined its
enforcement.' The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently affirmed
Amendment 2's enjoinment." After granting certiorari,8 theU.S. Supreme
Court held that Colorado's Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause 9
' Id The text of the amendment reads as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities
or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id
g Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15,
1993), ad, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
,See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993) (Evans 1).
8sEvans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14,
1993), af'd, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), af'd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 620
(1996). The State argued that Amendment 2 was passed to (1) deter factionalism;
(2) preserve the integrity of the State's political functions; (3) preserve the State's
resources to fight discrimination against suspect classes not including
homosexuals; (4) prevent government interference with personal, familial, and
religious privacy; (5) prevent government from subsidizing special interest group
legislation; and (6) promote the overall well-being of children. Id at *2.
" Id. at *13. The court found "only two compelling state interests that Amend-
ment 2 serves-the promotion or religious freedom and the promotion of family
privacy. As to those two interests, the Amendment is not 'narrowly drawn to
achieve that purpose in the least restrictive manner possible."' Id at *9.
87 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (Evans I), aft'd, 517 U.S.
620 (1996).
Romer v. Evans, 513 U.S. 1146 (1995).89Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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The Court rejected Colorado's claim that such ordinances provided
gays and lesbians with special rights as "implausible," stating:
[W]e cannot accept the view that Amendment 2's prohibition on specific
legal protection does no more than deprive homosexuals of special rights.
To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon those
person alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy
or may seek without constraint They can obtain specific protection
against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to
amend the State Constitution or perhaps, on the State's view, by trying to
pass helpful laws of general applicability.... We find nothing special in
the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for
granted by most people either because they already have them or do not
need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary
civic life in a free society.9'
The Court also considered the amendment's validity under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.92 The Colorado Supreme
Court had subjected Amendment 2 to strict scrutiny because it infringed
upon the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to engage in the political
process93 and was unable to find a compelling state interest to justify the
infringement. 4 Unlike the Colorado Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
evaluated the amendment under rational basis review,95 announcing thatthe
law was unconstitutional.' Finding no rational relationship to any
legitimate governmental interest, the Court stated that "[a] law declaring
90 Id at 626.
" Id at 631 (emphasis added).
92See id at 631-36.
93Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993) (Evans I).
Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994) (Evans II), afd, 517
U.S. 620 (1996).
95 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32. The Court offered no guidance on its choice
not to employ strict scrutiny review.
I See id at 635; see also James E. Barnett, Updating Romer v. Evans: The
Implications of the Supreme Court's Denial of Certiorari in Equality Foundation
of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 645,654 n.66
(1999) (noting that this is particularly interesting when one considers that the
Bowers Court found that "traditional morality alone was a rational justification
for a criminal statute because the 'law ... is constantly based on notions of
morality"') (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
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that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for
all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal
protection of the laws in the most literal sense."'97 In rejecting the legitimate
state interests that Colorado advanced,98 the Court held that a "desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest."
The Court's decision in Romer was heralded as the "first major
Supreme Court victory" for gays and lesbians."0 The impact of the
decision, however, is unclear. '0 While the decision explicitly prohibits
laws blocking gay and lesbian political participation, the Court's approval
of antidiscrimination laws protecting gays and lesbians is, at best, implicit
from the Court's unwillingness to allow gays to be exiled from the poli-
tical process. The majority found "nothing special in the protections
Amendment 2 with[held],""' but did not address whether homosexuals
constituted a protected class or even could constitute such a class.'03
Withholding suspect class status has led some federal courts to use Romer
v. Evans to uphold discriminatory legislation against gays and lesbians.",
Subsequent federal decisions, such as Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,"°s have left the impact of Romer on
.even shakier ground."°
97 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
" See id. at 635 (rejecting Colorado's contention that Amendment 2 advances
the legitimate state interest of respect for other citizens' freedom of association, in
particular the liberties of citizens with objections to homosexuality, and the
separate interest of conserving resources to fight discrimination against other
groups).
9 Id at 634 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
"l See Seidman, supra note 78, at 67-68.
101 See Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual Discrimination and Gender: Was
Romer v. Evans Really a Victoryfor Gay Rights?, 35 CAL. W. L. REv. 271 (1999).
" Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
103 See id at 631-32.
See Dodson, supra note 101, at 272.
105 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d289
(6th Cir. 1997) (Equality Foundation II).
106 See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997); Philips v.
Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d
1126(9th Cir. 1997); Jacksonv. United States Dep't ofAirForce, 132 F.3d39 (9th
Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Hrynda v. United
States, 933 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. Fla. 1996). But see Able v. United States, 968 F.
Supp. 850 (E.D. N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
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B. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati
Equality Foundation"°7 stands as the first test of the Supreme Court's
decision in Romer. In November 1993, a Cincinnati initiative known as
"Issue 3" was enacted. "' Like Amendment 2 in Colorado, the initiative was
a response to recently passed ordinances in Cincinnati that afforded gays
and lesbians legal protection from discrimination."° Upon passage, the
initiative became Article XII of the City Charter of Cincinnati."' The
Article prohibited the city from enacting or enforcing any ordinance
allowing homosexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship to provide
an individual with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected
status, quota preference, or other preferential status."' The Article
effectively voided previous ordinances that extended protection to
homosexuals, while also explicitly banning future ordinances."2
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
issued an injunction against enforcement of the Article." 3 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the judgment of the lower court and
107 Equality Foundation II, 128 F.3d at 289.
109 Cincinnati, Oh., Ordinance No. 314-1993 (Aug. 25, 1993) (election of Nov.
2, 1993).
" See Cincinnati, Oh., Ordinance No. 490-1992 (Nov. 25, 1992) (prohibiting
private discrimination in employment, housing, or public accommodation for
reasons of sexual orientation); Cincinnati, Oh., Ordinance No. 79-1991 (Mar. 13,
1991) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the city's hiring practices).
"' The Article read:
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCTORRELATIONSHIPS. The City
of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact,
adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which
provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct,
or relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the
basis to have any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or
other preferential treatment. This provision of the City Charter shall in all
respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule orpolicy enacted
before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition
shall be null and void and of no force or effect.
Cincinnati, Oh., City Charter art. XII (Aug. 25, 1993).
Il Id2
112 Id
"3 See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d261 (1995), vacatedby 518 U.S. 1001
(1996).
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vacated its injunction, holding that the Cincinnati Charter Amendment
offended neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion."' The court found that homosexuals did not constitute a suspect class
nor did the charter amendment violate any fundamental rights."' Applying
a rational basis test, the court concluded that the legislation furthered
legitimate governmental interests."' Subsequently, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision, remanding the
case "for further consideration in light of Romer v. Evans.""7
Upon remand, the Sixth Circuit distinguished the Romer decision,"'
citing the involvement of "substantially different enactments of entirely
distinct scope and impact, which conceptually and analytically distin-
guishedthe constitutional posture ofthetwo measures."" 9 Highlightingthe
differing political structures and environments in which the two measures
were born, the Sixth Circuit focused on the Supreme Court's comment that
Amendment 2 possibly removed any and all legal protection from gays and
lesbians, including generally applicable nondiscrimination provisions. 20 In
contrast, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the Cincinnati measure as only
removing the ability of homosexuals to obtain special rights.' The court
stated:
[T]he language of the Cincinnati Charter Amendment, read in its full
context, merely prevented homosexuals, as homosexuals, from obtaining
specialprivileges andpreferences(suchas affirmative action preferences
or the legally sanctioned power to force employers, landlords, and
merchants to transact business with them) from the City. In stark contrast,
Colorado Amendment 2's far broader language could be construed to
exclude homosexuals from the protection of every Colorado state law,
including laws generally applicable to all other Coloradans, thus rendering
gay people without recourse to any state authority at any level of
"' See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d
261,269-71 (6th Cir. 1995) (Equality Foundation I).
"I See id. at 266-67 & 266 n.2.
16 Id. at 270.
t7 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S.
1001 (1996).
1s See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d
289 (6th Cir. 1997) (Equality Foundation II).
19I d at 295.20 d at 295-97.
121 1d at 296.
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government for any type of victimization or abuse which they might suffer
by private or public actors.'2
The Sixth Circuit's effort to distinguish between Colorado's Amend-
ment 2 and Cincinnati's Issue 3 is plausible only if one assumes that the
laws have vastly different scopes: Colorado's law providing an out-right
denial of legal protection of any law to homosexuals versus Cincinnati's
law merely preventing homosexuals from receiving "preferential treat-
ment."'" The validity of that approach, however, is undercut by three facts:
(1) the Romer Court's statement that it would not construe Amendment 2
broadly enough to effectuate that result; 24 (2) the Colorado Supreme
Court's previous refusal to interpret Amendment 2 with such breadth," 3
and, most importantly, (3) the Sixth Circuit's own admission that the
Supreme Court did not construe Amendment 2 as a provision which denied
homosexuals the protection of other state antidiscrimination laws.'26 While
the U.S. Supreme Court doubted the Colorado Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of Amendment 2,27 the Court explicitly analyzed Amend-
ment 2 as a limited provision that solely disallowed preferential treatment
of homosexuals.' In the face of these facts, the effort of the Sixth Circuit
to distinguish the Cincinnati initiative from the Colorado amendment is
disingenuous at best, blatantly wrong at worst.
The Sixth Circuit held that the "narrow" language of the Cincinnati
Amendment "eliminated only 'special class status' and 'preferential
treatment' for gays as gays under Cincinnati ordinances and policies."'2
The Sixth Circuit followed the implicit precedent of Romer and refused to
recognize homosexuals as a suspect class"'30 and any infringement on a
fundamental right."' Based on these refusals, the appropriate standard of
" Id (emphasis added).23 Id at 296-97.
S2 ee Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1995).
'2 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo. 1994), af'd, 517 U.S.
620 (1996).
"2 See Equality Foundation II, 128 F.3d at 295.
'27 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
128 See id at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority stance that
Amendment 2 did not deny homosexuals the protection of general laws prohibiting
arbitrary discrimination).
129 Equality Foundation 1I, 128 F.3d at 297.
130 See id at 297 n.8.
131 See id at 297 (refusing to affirm district court's recognition that funda-
mental right emanated from Constitution and that Article XII deprived Cincinnati
gays and lesbians of exercising that right).
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review was determined to be rational basis review, thus Cincinnati needed
to show only a rational relationship between the legislation and a legitimate
governmental end."'
The Romer Court held that the legitimate justifications Colorado had
proffered for Amendment 2 fell short of any rational relation to the
legislation. 3 The Supreme Court's failure to find a rational relationship
between the law and any legitimate governmental interest primarily hinged
on the sheer breadth of Amendment 2.2' The Court stated that "[c]entral
both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee
of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts
remain open on impartial terms to all who seek assistance." 3' The Sixth
Circuit heldthatthose concerns were inapposite in Cincinnati's situation.'36
The court agreed with Romer that the state interests proffered by Colorado
were not threatened by any local legislation which protected homosexuals
through purely local means.'37 The court then distinguished that from the
Cincinnati legislation, where a municipality itself decided how to best
allocate its resources and serve its interests.' The court found Cincinnati's
interests to be "eliminat[ing] and forestall[ing] the substantial public costs
that accrue from the investigation and adjudication of sexual orientation
discrimination complaints."'39 The Sixth Circuit did not formally consider
the proponents' interests of associational liberty and moral disapproval of
homosexuality, noting the Supreme Court's disapproval of identical
"interests" in Romer."4°
When evaluating the rationality of Cincinnati's proposed government
interests, the Sixth Circuit failed to effectively address the primary
component ofRomer's concern-the sheer breadth of the challenged act." '
The Romer Courtwas concerned with the broad infringement upon political
participation that Amendment 2 imposed upon lesbians and gays, such as
32 See id
" Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. The justifications included respect of other citizens'
freedom of association, especially those with personal or religious objections to
homosexuality, and conserving resources to fight discrimination against other
groups.
" See id "The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these parti-
cular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them." Id
"I Id at 633.
136 See Equality Foundation II, 128 F.3d at 300.
137 See id.
13" See id
139 Id.
140See id at 301.
141 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635 (1996).
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forcing them to pass a state-wide amendment repealing Amendment 2 if
they desired to seek further legal protection from any level of
government' Cincinnati's amendment does not obviate this concern,
despite the Sixth Circuit's effort to distinguish the situations by focusing
on the fact that Amendment 2 was a statewide measure while Issue 3 was
a city-wide measure. 43 Both pieces of legislation represented legislative
hurdles not placed before any other group. While Cincinnati's legitimate
governmental interest in the protection of economic resources may
demonstrate a rational relationship to the aspect of the legislation that
arguably removed any "special status" that gays and lesbians had achieved,
the legitimacy of this interest is negated by the fact that the amendment
precludedfiture reinstatement of such ordinances.1" This fact undermines
the Sixth Circuit's rationale that Issue 3 represented the majority will of the
smallest political unit possible.
14 5
By forcing homosexuals to first push for a repeal of Issue 3 and only
then, subsequently, to seek legal protection legislation, Issue 3 is as
disruptive as Amendment 2 was in Romer. The Sixth Circuit's effort to
distinguish Romer from Cincinnati's Issue 3 based upon the size and
political posture of the issues in Cincinnati actually cutsfor invalidating
Issue 3 because, in reality, Cincinnati's Issue 3 represented a miniature
version of Colorado's Amendment 2. The same people, interests, barriers,
protections, and reasons were found in Cincinnati as in Colorado, only on
a smaller scale. In fact:
After these amendments passed, gay people in Colorado or Cincinnati
would [both] need a two-thirds majority to obtain legislative protection
against discrimination because they would first have to amend the
constitution or city charter. At the same time, other groups would simply
require a bare majority to create political change, since they would only
need to enact more favorable legislation.
146
The only significant difference between the two amendments may be
the greater availability for redress that may have been present in Cincinnati,
142 See id at 631.
143 See Equality Foundation II, 128 F.3d at 297 (noting that the Cincinnati
amendment was subject to change by the City Council in the normal political
process, unlike the repeal of a state-wide amendment as was required with
Colorado's Amendment 2).
144 See id. at 296, 300.
145 See id. at 297-300.
,4 Bobbi Bernstein, Note, Power, Prejudice, andthe Right to Speak- Litigating
"Outness "Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REv. 269,288 (1995).
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stemming from the fact that the city's action maintained the possibility of
being blocked by the state. The fact remains, however, that, in order to seek
protection from discrimination, homosexuals bore a heavier burden than
other citizens. No amount of legal interpretation escapes this conclusion,
which sits squarely in the text of Article XII of the City Charter of
Cincinnati. 47
Despite apparent inconsistency with Romer, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari after the Sixth Circuit's second opinion.' The denial was not
without an explicit warning from Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg
not to imply the Court's position from the certiorari denial.4 9 Justice
Stevens pointed out that the Court relied upon the Sixth Circuit's construc-
tion of the Cincinnati city charter as removing "special protections" for
gays and lesbians. 5' This position, unfortunately, is at odds with the
Court's decision in Romer in which the Court found "nothing special in the
protections Amendment 2 with[held]."'' This inconsistency leaves open
the question of the potency of Romer and the Supreme Court's dedication
to it. Furthermore, the contrasting opinions from the Sixth Circuit and the
Supreme Court beg the question: Are Kentucky's four ordinances
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination "special" rights?'52
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO LAWS
PROHIBITING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
With no federal protection against private sexual orientation discrimi-
nation,5 3 state and local governments enacted their own remedies.
Currently, eighteen states and approximately 203 localities have taken the
'47 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
'"See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S.
943 (1998).
149 See id.
o See id (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
'51 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,631 (1996).
'
2 See discussion infra Part IV.
s Sexual orientation discrimination in public employment in the federal gov-
ernment was prohibited. See Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May
28, 1998) (amending Exec. OrderNo. 11,478,34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (Aug. 8, 1969),
to include sexual orientation protection). See also Exec. OrderNo. 13,152,65 Fed.
Reg. 26,115 (May 2,2000) (authorizing development of guidelines on provisions
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination). Cf Exec. OrderNo. 13,160,65 Fed.
Reg. 39,773 (June 23, 2000) (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in
federally conducted education and training programs).
2000-2001] 1207
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
initiative to prohibit such discrimination."' Typically, such laws prohibit
discrimination based upon sexual orientation in areas such as public and
private employment, housing, public accommodations, education, credit,
and union practices. Passage of such laws has predictably spawned
numerous legal challenges, questioning both the legal ability of state and
local governments to enact such measures and the effect of such laws on
the constitutional rights of others."5 To date, the Supreme Court has
decided two cases addressing the efficacy of state laws prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination: Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston5 6 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. s7 Both
decisions addressed the proper balancing of one party's free speech claim
against another group's ability to participate in a public accommodation as
mandated by a non-discrimination state law.'58 Both times the homosexual
party was denied inclusion because of the free speech rights of the
protesting group as interpreted by the Court." 9
A. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
In Hurley," a group of gay and lesbian marchers requested to march
in the Boston St. Patrick's Day parade."' Massachusetts had passed a state
law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, 62 but parade organizers refused to allow the Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston ("GLIB") to march in the parade
and carry a sign displaying the name of the group." The organizers
claimed that the group communicated a message it did riot want to convey
by carrying the sign.'" The parade organizers did not prohibit gay and
'
54 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
's See, e.g., Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C.
1987) (en bane); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985); Dignity Twin
Cities v. Newman Ctr. & Chapel, 472 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991);
Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985),
af'd, 389 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1986).
116 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557 (1995).
"' Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
'
58 See infra Part m.A-B.
159 See infra Part I.A-B.
160 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557.
161 See id at 561.
162 See id
1 Id.
16Id at 562.
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lesbian individuals from marching in the parade as part of other groups, 65
but they did not want people to self-identify as gay and lesbian and
simultaneously participate in the parade. Ultimately, the state forced the
parade organizers to allow the lesbian and gay group to march, and the
organizers challenged the inclusion of the group the following year.'6
Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the expressive nature of
parades and held that the protected expressive element in a parade lay not
only in the banners and songs within the parade, but also extended to the
choice of participants. 67 Equally expressive, the Court held, was the
possible participation of GLIB.
GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in [the parade],...
in order to celebrate its members' identity as openly gay, lesbian, and
bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants, to show that there are such
individuals in the community, and to support the like men and women
who sought to march in the New York parade.'6
The Court then made the critical distinction in the case. While
upholding the validity of the Massachusetts antidiscrimination law,169 the
Court distinguished between the law protecting a gay or lesbian individ-
ual's legal right to participate in the parade and the ability of the law to
shape and change the organizers' message, which received First Amend-
ment protection. 7' The former was constitutional, the latter not. The Court
observed:
[O]nce the expressive character of both the parade and the marching
GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes apparent that the state courts'
application of the statute had the effect of declaring the sponsors' speech
itself to bethe public accommodation. Underthis approach any contingent
of protected individuals with amessage wouldhavethe rightto participate
in [the organizers'] speech.
171
The parade organizers did not dispute that the state antidiscrimination
law guaranteed the participation of gay and lesbian individuals,1" but the
'6s See id. at 572.
'6" See id. at 561.
' 67 See id. at 569-70.
168 Id. at 570.
69 See id. at 571-72.
1
70 See id. at 573.
171 Id.
7 See id. at 572.
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organizers claimed that by allowing the gay and lesbian group to participate
in the parade with a sign indicating their presence as a unit, it would have,
in their opinion, signaled acceptance of homosexuals.Y3 The Supreme
Court agreed, stating:
[A] contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at least
bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and
the presence of the organized marchers would suggest their view that
people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to unqualified
social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of parade units
organized around other identifying characteristics.174
Turning to the First Amendment rights of the organizers, the Court
reiterated, "one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is
that one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say."'m
75
Addressing the denial of GLIB's marching, the Court stated, "the Council
clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like." 76 The parade
organizers, however, had rarely used the selection or exclusion of groups
to construct a particular message. The organizers' failure to routinely
exercise control over the messages of the marching groups was a fact not
lost upon the trial court. The opinion stated that the parade organizers
"occasionally admitted groups who simply showed up at the parade without
having submitted an application, and [the Council] did not generally inquire
into the specific messages" of each group that applied for marching
privileges. 1" The Supreme Court admitted that the Council was "rather
lenient in admitting participants," but that leniency did not obviate the
organizers' right to control their own message.'78 Thus, the organizers
retained their constitutional right to control their message sans a homosex-
ual marching unit, despite the Massachusetts law."
The validity of Massachusetts' antidiscrimination law was not
addressed by the Court, yet the ultimate resolution of the case questions the
potency of the law. The truly troubling aspect of Hurley springs from the
Court's assumptions regarding the message communicated simply by the
17 Id at 574-75.
174Id at 574.
175 Id at 573 (quoting Pae. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
I76 Id at 574 (emphasis added).
'Id. at 562.
178 Id. at 569.
179 See id at 569-70.
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presence of GLIB in the parade. GLIB desired not to carry sloganeering
banners like "Gay Rights Now!" or "We're Here and We're Queer," but
rather wished only to carry a simple sign indicating their name. 8' Yet, the
Court concluded that GLIB's mere "presence... would suggest their view
that people of their sexual orientation have as much claim to unqualified
social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of parade units
organized around other identifying characteristics....'
The first response to the Court's assumption about the presence of
GLIB is "Exactly!" What else but social acceptance and equality could
have been the motivating factor behind the passage of Massachusetts's law
in the first place? The existence of the law is a testament that the state
intends to enforce the principle that gay and lesbian citizens have as much
a right to social participation as any other citizen. While the state cannot
force individuals to personally accept homosexuality, it can prevent
individuals from discriminating against homosexuals and their participation
in public accommodations. The Court's conclusion regarding the message
communicated by GLIB's potential participation in the parade equates to
telling an African-American that allowing him to sit at a lunch counter
would give the impression he is equal to everyone else and entitled to use
and enjoy public accommodations. When placed in such context, the
Court's analysis appears superficial and misplaced.
Secondly, it remains to be seen that the group itself was asking for
acceptance in its "message." The Court noted that GLIB's goals were to
celebrate their identity as open homosexuals, to demonstrate that gay and
lesbian individuals existed in the community, and to show solidarity with
like men and women participating in the corresponding New York
parade." Nowhere, however, within those goals is a solicitation for
acceptance by the parade organizers or anyone else for that matter. The
Court seemed to conclude presumptively that the group would attempt to
communicate a message beyond that of participation. "GLIB understand-
ably seeks to communicate its ideas as part of the existing parade ....
There are a myriad of possible messages to be communicated by the
group's inclusion, none of which would be universally understood. At
minimum, inclusion of the group would only communicate a message of
80 See id at 570. Interestingly, not all signs in the parade were neutral. Many
signs advocated a rejection of drugs while others commented on the political and
cultural conflicts between Ireland and England. See id at 569.
I'lld at 574.
'821 d. at 570.
1Id.
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existence. Existence, however, is not a request for acceptance. The group,
perhaps, could not care less if anyone accepts them. For the Court to imply
a request for acceptance from a group well versed in unacceptance is
disingenuous. To infer that they needed or wanted acceptance is perhaps a
subconscious result of the Court's internalized, biased approach to a
marginalized group. Certainly self-identification does not equal a solicita-
tion for acceptance.'" While itmay express abeliefin self-validity, tojump
from self-identification to a solicitation for acceptance, as the Court easily
did, is an intellectual misstep.
The most damning question left in the wake of the Hurley opinion is
how the homosexual group could have ever participated? The answer is that
they could only participate if they communicated no message at all or at
least communicated a message that the parade organizers would tolerate.
Neither of these is a possible answer under the Court's analysis in Hurley.
If the presence of a group infers a message of requested acceptance, that
group can never not communicate that message.
Despite the multitude of assumptions and stereotypes, the Hurley ruling
could at least be rationalized by the fact that the group literally desired to
carry a physical sign, albeit one only intending to identify the name of the
group. In the Court's next foray into homosexual identity and its concomi-
tant implications with laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination,
when the gay individual involved carried no sign, the Court handed him
one.
B. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 5
James Dale was an excellent Boy Scout, achieving the rare ranking of
Eagle Scout. From Scout to Scoutmaster, no one ever doubted his abilities
and talents that served the Boy Scouts of America ("BSA") well for over
a decade. Dale's quality of service to the Boy Scouts apparently changed,
however, when Dale was photographed for a newspaper article in which he
admitted he was gay.' 6 In the article, Dale mentioned the need for role
models for gay and lesbian youth. He never mentioned his involvement
with the Boy Scouts, nor did he claim that gay Boy Scouts would be good
role models or good scouts. Weeks later, Dale was informed he was no
"' See Nan Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissentfor Equality, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 11 (2000).
"' Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
186Id. at 645.
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longer a Boy Scout. 87 After requesting why he had been expelled from the
group, he was informed that homosexual conduct was incompatible with
scouting and its principals. Dale subsequently sued under New Jersey's
antidiscrimination law that prohibited sexual orientation discrimination in
public accommodations.'"
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the Boy Scouts's claim by
recognizing that implicit in the First Amendment was the "right to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends."'" 9 From the freedom to associate,
the Court held, redounds a freedom not to associate.190 The freedom to
associate would be infringed upon if the forced inclusion of a third person
"affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or
private viewpoints.". 1 The freedom not to associate, however, was not
absolute and could be overridden by laws serving "compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive."" 9 Thus, the Court was faced
with three questions: (1) Did the Boy Scouts engage in expressive
association as to homosexuality?; (2) Would the presence of James Dale
impermissibly interfere with the Boy Scouts's freedom of expressive
association?; and (3) Was the Boy Scouts's freedom of expressive
association overridden by state interests in the antidiscrimination law? 93
The Court described the Scouts as an organization engaged in
"instill[ing] values in young people." 94 Referencing those values, the Boy
Scouts claimed that homosexual conduct"gs was "inconsistent with the
187 Id
188 Id
19 Id. at 647 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984)).
190 Id. at 648.
1 Id. (citing New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13
(1988)).
" Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
193 See id at 647-61.
194 Id. at 649.
t"I The exact contours of the differences between homosexual status and homo-
sexual conduct are debated. Opponents of homosexuality may be inclined to draw
little difference between homosexual status and conduct. Indeed, those who define
homosexuality by conduct alone draw no difference, and argue that, since
homosexual conduct may be criminalized, one's status as a homosexual should
receive no special treatment. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Many others, however, will advance that homosexual
2000-20011 "SPECIAL RIGHiTS" 1213
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
values" it sought to instill,"9 and the BSA claimed to have a policy against
"active homosexuality" in the Scouts."9 The Boy Scouts claimed that
homosexual conduct violated the Scout Oath and the Scout Law.' The
BSA pointed to the Scout Oath's pledge for boys to be "morally straight"''
and the Scout Law's promise to be "clean." 2'
In answering their first inquiry, the Court determined that the BSA
engaged in "expressive association" concerning homosexuality to reach
First Amendment protection.2"' Admitting that nowhere in the Scout Law
or Oath was sexuality mentioned, the Court added that "morally straight"
and "clean" are highly subjective. 2 Despite the Court's admission of
ambiguity, the Court relied upon statements in BSA's brief that stated:
"[BSA] teach[es] that homosexual conduct is not morally straight" and that
BSA does "not want to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form
of behavior."2 3 The analysis ends there. Because BSA's brief reflected
their belief that homosexuality was neither "legitimate" nor "morally
conduct is very different from the experience or status of being gay or lesbian.
Many courts have explicitly recognized no difference when adopting views from
the Supreme Court's statement concerning Georgia's sodomy law in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). However, the Supreme Court appeared to draw
a distinct line in its opinion in Romer. No resolution to this debate appears
imminent.
' Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
1 See id at 645. The preface "active" may shed some light on the expressive
identity concept. Since the Boy Scouts never had any knowledge of James Dale's
sexual history, "active homosexuality" must mean something apart from being
sexually active. In this context, "active" can only mean "out" or expressed
homosexuality. Thus, the Boy Scouts's policy would not apply to the "closeted"
homosexual. This is an interesting conceptual bifurcation of homosexuality, but
perhaps it is a necessary one. The "active" component is expression. This must
necessarily be different from the status of homosexuality. The phrase "active
homosexuality" then could be held to demonstrate dual elements: status and
expression.
191 Id at 650.
1 Id. The Scout Oath reads: "On my honor I will do my best To do my duty to
God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times;
To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight." ld at 649.
200 Id at 650. The Scout Law reads: "A Scout is: Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful,
Friendly, Courteous, Kind, Obedient, Cheerful, Thrifty, Brave, Clean, Reverent."
Id at 649.
20 Id at 655.
2021d at 650.
203 d at 651.
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straight," the Court proceeded to find expressive association concerning
sexual orientation.2 " As the Dale dissent points out, the Court had never
before found expressive association based purely on a statement in a brief
to the Court.2 " The Court then reviewed examples of statements that BSA
had made concerning homosexuality, but commented that such review was
merely "instructive" as to the sincerity of the BSA's views.2"
The Court turned to the second, and most intriguing, question: Did
James Dale's presence as a scoutmaster affect the BSA's message against
"homosexual conduct?"2 7 From the beginning, the Court made clear it
would give deference to the opinion of the BSA as to how Dale's presence
would affect them." 8 The Court noted that Dale was "open" about his
homosexuality, was a "gay Scout... leader[ ] in their community," and "a
gay rights activist."20 9 The Court, again without analysis, stated, "Dale's
presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization
to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy
Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
210
In support of the Court's belief regarding the message James Dale
would force upon the BSA, the Court cited Hurley."' The Court's reliance
on Hurley, however, is misplaced. In Hurley, the Court held that a
Massachusetts antidiscrimination law impermissibly infringed upon the
First Amendment rights of parade organizers. 212 The'decision rested upon
a distinction the Court drew between the actual parade itself and the
"message" embodied in the total parade. 3 The Hurley Court reiterated the
2' See id
205 Id at 685-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 651.
207 Id. at 653.
2o8 Id. at 651 (citing Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La
Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981)).
2 Id at 653 (citation omitted). It is unclear how Dale, at the time of his dismissal
from the Boy Scouts, was a gay rights activist. Certainly, as the litigation continued,
he gained notoriety as a gay man fighting for his right to be in the Boy Scouts-but
is that enough to make one an activist? If the Court is asking how the inclusion of
Dale, at the time of his dismissal, would have affected the Boy Scouts's message, it
is irrelevant to the analysis that the majority of Justices viewed him as an "activist" at
the time the opinion was authored. In fact, it is patently wrong.210 d (emphasis added).
211 Id. at 653-54.
2" Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557,559 (1995).213Id at 572-73.
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validity of the antidiscrimination law"' and did not question the ability of
individual gay and lesbian citizens to participate in the parade.2 5 The
parade organizers also denied any attempt to preclude homosexual
individuals from participating in the parade.21 6 The dispute in Hurley
revolved around the participation of a homosexual group that would have
identified itself during the parade by carrying a sign indicating the name of
the group. "[T]he disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own
parade unit carrying its own banner."2 7
The facts of Dale are not so situated. James Dale had not requested to
carry a sign while he was leading a Scout meeting, nor had he ever
combined his participation in the Boy Scouts with anything "homosex-
ual."2 " Dale's presence in the Scouts more closely reflected that of the
marchers inHurleywhich the Court did not address: openly gay individuals
participating in the parade in various, "non-gay" groups. 2 9 The parade
organizers in Boston had no problem with those marchers, obviously
because they perceived no "message" being communicated. The Hurley
opinion implies that there was no problem with the law providing for the
participation of homosexual individuals in the parade when the Court
remarked on the innocuousness of the statute on its face 0
The Court's reliance on Hurley in support of their view is flawed in
another respect. The Hurley decision turned upon the message desired by
the parade organizers in Boston as protected by the First Amendment rather
than on the message the Court believed would be inferred by the participa-
tion of an identified homosexual group." The problem was the conflicting
214 Id. at 571-72.
215 Id. at 572.
2 16 Id.
217 Id.
218 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 689 (2000) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("BSA has not contended, nor does the record support, that Dale had ever
advocated a view on homosexuality to his troop before his membership was
revoked.").
219 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. The Massachusetts law was not challenged on
the ground that it allowed openly gay individuals to participate in the parade.
Rather, the challenge focused on the ability to exclude gay "groups" and not gay
individuals. "Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and
no individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a
member of any group .... [T]he disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as
its own parade unit carrying its own banner." Id
220 See id at 571-72.
221Id. at 574.
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messages, and, thus, the right to control one's message as guaranteed by the
First Amendment trumped the right of the homosexual group requesting
inclusion. In Dale, however, it is apparent that the reason for James Dale's
dismissal from the Scouts was not about any perceived message. The Court
considered Dale's point that the BSA did not expel heterosexual members
who did not support the policy against homosexual conduct irrelevant. "The
presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant
scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message from the
presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as
disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy." The Court provides no justification
for the difficult distinction it draws on this point, nor does it explain its
reasoning. The omission, however, speaks volumes. In truth, the only
difference between a heterosexual who opposes an exclusionary policy and
a homosexual who opposes an exclusionary policy is sexual orientation. If
the BSA's message is one of exclusion, both the heterosexual and
homosexual equally interfere with the Scout's ability to express that
message by propounding a contrary view. Yet, only the homosexual is
excluded from the group. The Court's narrow analysis makes it quite clear
that at issue is not message, but rather sexual orientation-a problem
supposedly solved by the passage of New Jersey's antidiscrimination law.
Despite the Court's identification of the adverse impact upon the
expressive association rights of the Boy Scouts (resulting from Dale's
inclusion), the Court next querried whether a compelling state interest
warranted such an intrusion. The Court recognized that states have
compelling interests in ending gender discrimination,' citing Roberts v.
UnitedStates Jaycees 4 and Board ofDirectors ofRotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte.m In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Jaycees
challenged a MinnesotaHuman Rights Actwhich prohibited discrimination
based upon race and sex, claiming their freedom of association protected
their right to discriminate and associate with only those they wish. 6 The
Court, however, disagreed: "[i]nfringements on that right may be justified
by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly
less restrictive of associational freedoms." 7 The Court noted that "Minne-
"" Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).
SId. at 657.
-4 Robert v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
" Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
2 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615.
227 Id at 623; accord Duarte, 481 U.S. at 546-47.
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sota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female
citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees
may have on the male members' associational freedoms." '
The Court in Dale distinguished Roberts, contending that enforcement
of the statute in question in those cases "would not materially interfere with
the ideas that the organization sought to express." The Court asked if
New Jersey's law placed a "serious burden" on the associational expression
of the BSA?" Without analysis, the Court announced, "[W]e have already
concluded that a state requirement that the Boy Scouts retain Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the organization's right to
oppose or disfavor homosexual conduct."' The Court's reference to
"already conclud[ing]" must be its statement that admission of Dale would
force the BSA to admit te the world that "homosexual conduct" is a
"legitimate form of behavior."232 However, as stated earlier, the Court
relied on Hurley to reach this conclusion-arguably this reliance is
misplaced. 3 The Court struck down the law as applied to the Boy Scouts
after finding Dale's inclusion in BSA placed a significant burden on its
expressive association."M With respect to New Jersey's interest in ending
discrimination against homosexuals, the Court curtly stated, "[t]he state
interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations law do not
justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts's rights to freedom of
expressive association."' 5
C. Impact of Hurley and Dale
The Supreme Court in Hurley and Dale imports message after message
onto homosexuals to the point that lesbians and gay men come to resemble
walking billboards. In Hurley, participation by the homosexual marchers
represented a demand for equality and a concession by the parade
organizers that a homosexual "lifestyle" was "legitimate."'216 In Dale,
allowing a gay scoutmaster was an immediate challenge to the validity of
2n Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
229 Dale, 530 U.S. at 657.230 1d at 656.
211 Id. at 659.232 ld at 653.
"-, See discussion supra notes 211-22 and accompanying text.
234 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
235 Id.
16 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995).
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policies such as "moral straightness" and "cleanliness" as well as an
implied assertion by James Dale that homosexuality was "straight" and
"clean." Ironically, neither the Boston parade organizers nor theBoy Scouts
had any meaningful expression concerning homosexuality prior to the
inclusion of homosexuals in the group. Yet, upon inclusion of homosexu-
als, these groups suddenly found their "message" challenged. And, both
times, homosexuals lost, despite the expressed will of their home state in
the form of antidiscrimination statutes.
Under this analysis, any civil rights claim homosexuals are ever to
make becomes automatically transformed (by the perceived messages) into
"a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression."'" Hurley
and Dale represent a not-so-new trend in constitutional jurisprudence-the
inevitable clash between equality and expression. 8 The collision occurs
when two groups attempt to occupy the same social vehicle (i.e., a parade
or Boy Scout troop) and one group claims the vehicle for expressive
purposes and the other group claims the vehicle for identity or equality
purposes. Do we favor expression or equality? At best, the Court's
jurisprudence has been haphazard. What we do know is that when a group
clamoring for equality does so on race or gender grounds, the Court
consistently has stood with the equality group and against the expression
group. This stance, however, shifts when homosexuals attempt to claim the
same societal discursive space. In Dale and Hurley, the Court focused on
the damage to the speakers' message with little ink spilled on the equality
claims of homosexuals. Rather than evaluating the equality claims under
state nondiscrimination laws, the Court proceeded to transform their claims
of equality into claims of counter-expression against the very groups into
which they sought entrance. Certainly members of the Jaycees felt it
improper for women to hold membership, yet the Court found a more
compelling societal need to include women in the Roberts decision. On the
other hand, members of the Boston parade organizing group and the Boy
Scouts felt it inappropriate to include homosexuals, and the Court
obviously felt no great compelling societal need to include homosexuals
regardless of the expressed will of individual states.
IV. THE "SPECIAL" RIGHTS ARGUMENT
One of the most pervasive policy attacks against laws prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination is to label such laws "special" rights. This
237Id. at 579.
'" See Hunter, supra note 184, at I.
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argument is often driven by the view that homosexuality is a chosen
behavior rather than an innate individual characteristic, and, thus,
individuals should not be allowed to "opt in" to a category of extra
protection. Opponents of such laws point to a traditional reprobation of
homosexuality and conclude that legal protections that "encourage" such
behavior should not exist. Some point to an ever-expanding field of
"protected" classes of people and wonder aloud who is not protected.
Others blame a growing "victim" mentality in society. Some see a
diminishing difference between antidiscrimination laws and affirmative
action laws. 9 Still others believe that legal protections for homosexuals
mock traditional family values and will lead to the ultimate failure of the
family.
Like the origins of homosexuality, however, the line between an
"equal" right and a "special" right has yet to be determined. This may be
a direct result of public rhetoric having blurred the distinction between
"equal" and "special" rights. This is especially troubling when one
considers that often the sloganeering and rhetoric surrounding "special"
rights will have a more substantial impact on the public-at-large than any
legal precedent or theological position.2 ° In reality, the issue of "special"
rights drives the entire debate concerning gay rights in one form or another,
and, thus, deserves attention.
The influence and persuasiveness of this concept has not escaped the
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court.241 However, what exactly a
"special" right is as opposed to an "equal" right has even the courts
bewildered. Most often, the difference boils down to differences in
perspective and, occasionally, blatant stereotyping and prejudices.
The label of "special" rights will often obfuscate the real aim of a law
for a court. As Professor Peter Rubin explains:
One of the reasons the claim of special rights is rhetorically powerful is
because it tars antidiscrimination law with the brush of racial and gender
preferences. Many Americans believe such preferences amount to
discrimination against those who do not receive them, and that they are
antithetical to the idea of equal treatment for all.242
239See Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Anti-
discrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 568 (1998).
240 See id. at 565-67.
"See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); Equal. Found. v. City of
Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 296 (6th Cir. 1997).
12 Rubin, supra note 239, at 566 (emphasis added).
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Today, laws prohibiting discrimination based on race, gender, and age
largely escape rebuke as "special" rights, though in the past they were
similarly attacked.243 During debate over the proposed Civil Rights Act of
1964, one Senator retorted: "Under a misleading banner labeled 'equal
opportunity,' proponents.., would have the Congress enact what in fact
and substance is 'the Special Privilege Act of 1963.' For rights won at the
expense of others' rights are not rights at all, but special privileges."2" The
challenge has an eerie character when one considers how readily civil rights
laws are contemporarily accepted. Thus, one must ask why issues
concerning sexual orientation are experiencing a repeat of history. If all
civil rights are "special," what makes certain efforts valid, while others are
invalid?24 Alternatively, are only antidiscrimination laws aimed at sexual
orientation special?
An immediate difference separating sexual orientation from most other
identified classes is the debate over "choice" in sexual orientation. Many
maintain that a right stemming from a "chosen" behavior unfairly allows
those who choose to be homosexual greater, undeserved, and unequal
protection over those who do not so choose. Nevertheless, choice alone
cannot explain this approach because religion is chosen conduct and has
enjoyed historical, as well as constitutional, protection. Moreover, marital
status, smoking status, and, to some degree, veteran status are all chosen
conduct that have received protected status from various states. Thus,
Americans must not be completely antithetical to the idea of protecting
something which the individual chooses. There must be another distinction
beyond "choice" which makes laws prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination "special" rights.
The impact of antidiscrimination laws can vary greatly, depending on
an individual's perspective. For the individual desiring to discriminate, the
antidiscrimination law becomes a prohibition of activity that signals out a
group that he or she is now required to treat differently. For the protected
individual, the antidiscrimination law ensures not treatment like all others,
but only protection from the efforts of those who would discriminate
against them'" Perhaps, in this way, antidiscrimination laws protecting
243 See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate
over Lesbian and Gay CivilRights, 9 NOTREDAMEJL. ETIcs& PuB. POL'Y 137,
144-54(1995).244 
1d. at 149 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 4760 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hill)).
1s Is allowing African-Americans to sit at a lunch counter a "special" right?
This question is specifically posed by Karen Engle. See Karen Engle, What's So
SpecialAbout Special Rights, 75 DENv. U. L. REv. 1265, 1274-75 (1998).2 See Rubin, supra note 239, at 573.
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gays and lesbians are "special," but this begs the question: Is the right to
keep a job, live in a house, or patronize a restaurant free from discrimina-
tion anything inherently special? Under this analysis, religious and
disability protections must be considered "special," as well as laws
regarding gender, age, or race. From this perspective, the only thing
"special" about antidiscrimination laws is their necessity to exist.
The proponents of Colorado's Amendment 2 proclaimed that it did
nothing more than deny homosexuals "special" rights.24 However, almost
every antidiscrimination law will be couched in terms of sexual orientation,
not homosexuality. Heterosexuality is also a sexual orientation, and, thus,
if these type of laws give homosexuals any type of "special" right, they
must, by their very language, grant heterosexuals that same "special" right.
While no one worries about discrimination based upon heterosexuality, the
semantic difference is ultimately important, though routinely ignored. Once
both heterosexuals and homosexuals are protected from sexual orientation
discrimination, the protection no longer is "special."
A strong case can be made that heterosexuals have been the recipients
of "special" rights, using Colorado and Cincinnati as prime examples. Both
Colorado's Amendment 2 and Cincinnati's Issue 3249 imposed barriers to
homosexuals seeking legal protection. Neither legislative effort, however,
imposed similar burdens on heterosexuals. Under both laws, heterosexuals
retained the right to petition for laws prohibiting heterosexual discrimina-
tion, while homosexuals were burdened with laws which prohibited any
effort to seek legal or legislative redress. If a "special" right is the ability
to do something that others cannot or to be granted unequal access or
privilege, heterosexuals, not homosexuals, were the recipients of "special"
rights in Colorado and Cincinnati. Homosexuals were granted no right or
privilege that heterosexuals are denied.
The Romer Court stated that it found "nothing special in the protections
Amendment 2 withholds," ' thus rebuffing the state's claims that it was
merely denying lesbians and gay special rights or privileges. However,
James Barnett presents the other side of the coin:
Of course, this statement represents a value judgment not shared by all
Americans. The counterargument is that homosexuals already have the
same constitutional rights granted to them as any other American, and, if
a homosexual is a senior citizen or racial minority, the same constitutional
' 7 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1995).
24s See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
2
10 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
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protections afforded all senior citizens and all racial minorities. Any law
conferring upon homosexuals a favored status because of their sexual
preference is one that grants a "special" right.251
Barnett is correct in the fact that the same constitutional protections
apply to homosexuals as any other American, regardless of the fact that
application of those rights may be uneven. However, in 1964, was the same
not true of African-Americans? The answer is yes, and it quite succinctly
points out the error in Barnett's argument. Barnett's point would be well-
taken if such antidiscrimination laws granted gays and lesbians new rights
shared by no one else. For example, laws granting homosexuals the right
to steal without punishment would be a "special" right. 52 That, however,
is not the situation with laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimina-
tion. 2 3 By prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination and not homosex-
ual discrimination, such laws avoid creating uneven rights. While few
could deny that the impetus of such laws is the protection of a disfavored
minority, the language utilized in such efforts effectively prevents the
granting of a "special" right. Commentators such as Barnett frequently
overlook this powerful legislative symmetry.
Far from labeling laws which protect homosexuals as "special," some
state courts have found the protection constitutionally mandated. In the
landmark case Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co." the California Supreme Court held that admission of one's
homosexuality constituted a "political activity" as defined in California's
labor code.5 The court stated:
[T]he struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights, particularly
in the field of employment, must be recognized as a political activity.
Indeed the subject of the rights of homosexuals incites heated political
debate today, and the "gay liberation movement' encourages its homosex-
ual members to attempt to convince other members of society that
homosexuals should be accorded the same fundamental rights as
heterosexuals. The aims of the struggle for homosexual rights, and the
251 Barnett, supra note 96, at 655-56 (drawing upon Scalia's dissent in Romer,
517 U.S. at 644).2 2 Engle poses a similar problem. See Engle, supra note 245, at 1279.
"3Admittedly, Bamett'spointgains validity when discussing affirmative action
laws. However, a great majority of laws prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination explicitly state that no quotas or preferential treatment is designed.
' Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
215See id. at 610.
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tactics employed, bear a close analogy to the continuing struggle for civil
rights waged by blacks, women, and other minorities.
A principal barrier to homosexual equality is the common feeling that
homosexuality is an affliction which the homosexual worker must conceal
from his employer and his fellow workers. Consequently one important
aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce homosexual individuals
to "come out of the closet," acknowledge their sexual preferences, and to
associate with others in working for equal rights."
The court's opinion incorporated sexual orientation into the protections
offered by California's Labor Code, which previously had prevented
employers from interfering in the rights of employees to engage in political
activity. 7 Protections were subsequently extended to "closeted" homosex-
uals. 8 Embodied in the court's approach is the rejection of the idea that
homosexuality consists solely of conduct. Rather, the court cites the
pressures, goals, fears, and challenges that are omnipresent for most gay
and lesbian citizens. 9 Implicit from the fear of discovery that the court
acknowledges is the recognition of the unique status that being open about
homosexuality achieves, concomitant with its social, political, and
economic consequences. While few courts have adopted this approach, the
reasoning utilized by the court is compelling when one considers the true
nature and, more importantly, the consequences of an individual's openness
regarding her or his homosexuality. In his dissent over the denial of
certiorari in Rowland v. MadRiver Local School District, Justice Brennan
also noted the unique political nature of an admission of homosexuality and
stated that the state cannot condition employment on "any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community," '60 and that Rowland's
comments involved her in the political debate regarding sexual
orientation.2 6'
Ultimately, there is no resolution to the special rights argument. What
should be realized, however, are the numerous fallacies supporting many
of the arguments advanced by those labeling antidiscrimination efforts as
Id. (citations omitted).
217 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1989).
" See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 88 (App. 1991),
petition for review granted, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 180 (1992), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1993).
29 See Gay Law Students Ass', 595 P.2d at 610.
260 Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1011-12 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quotingConnickv. Myers,461 U.S. 138,146-47(1983)).
26' See id. at 1012.
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"special." Unfortunately, the rhetoric around "special" rights too often
obfuscates the real issues. Those on both sides of the special rights
argument should be ever-vigilant to ensure that biases and prejudices do not
overshadow the substantive issues surrounding laws prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The moral, ethical, social, and political tensions surrounding the issue
of sexual orientation are reflected in ajudicial schizophrenia that respects
the ability to protect homosexuals from discrimination, 6 2 yet dismisses
such protections once challenged,26 with a rapidity nowhere found in
analogous cases regarding issues of racial and gender discrimination. In
Hurley and Dale, the Supreme Court adopted, perhaps unintentionally, the
approach of the Boston parade organizers: if you are homosexual, you can
be in the parade, but do not let anyone know who you are. It is laudable to
protect the ability of state and local governments to pass laws prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination as the Romer Court did, but opinions such
as Dale and Hurley undermine such efforts by relegating them to legislative
nihilism. If a law does not work, why have the law? Would we ask racial
minorities or women to hide the very characteristic we choose to protect?
Perhaps buttressing the development of the case law thus far has been
the notion that we are dealing with "special" rights. Ultimately, such laws
may receive little respect or due enforcement until the time when such
efforts are considered "equal" rights. That process is surely only a function
of time. In the meantime, however, the hope must be that the sheer
humanity of things as elementary as a home or ajob will stand in defense
of laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.
2 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995).
SSee Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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